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The Republic of Korea (ROK) experienced a public health crisis due to Middle 
East respiratory syndrome (MERS) in 2015 and is currently going through the 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Lessons learned from the di-
sastrous MERS outbreak were ref lected in the preparedness system, and the 
readiness capabilities that were subsequently developed enabled the country to 
successfully flatten the epidemic curve of COVID-19 in late February and March 
2020. In this review, we summarize and compare the epidemiology and response 
of the ROK to the 2015 MERS outbreak and the COVID-19 epidemic in early 2020. 
We emphasize that, because further COVID-19 waves seem inevitable, it is urgent 
to develop comprehensive preparedness and response plans for the worst-case 
scenarios of the COVID-19 pandemic. Simultaneously strengthening healthcare 
capacity to endure the peak demand and implementing smart strategies to sus-
tain social distancing and public hygiene are necessary until safe and effective 
therapeutics and vaccines against COVID-19 are available.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the Republic of Korea (ROK) experienced a 
public health crisis due to Middle East respiratory syn-
drome (MERS), which exposed the weaknesses of the 
national health disaster response system. Since Janu-
ary 2020, the ROK has been experiencing the corona-
virus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic caused by a 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-
CoV-2). MERS and COVID-19 share common charac-
teristics: both are emerging novel coronaviruses with 
a zoonotic origin and can be fatal, particularly in both 
older adults and people with chronic medical condi-
tions [1,2]; superspreading events (SSEs) form the over-
all epi-curve of both outbreaks [3]; and both pose global 
health threats in the absence of therapeutics or vaccines 
[4,5]. However, SARS-CoV-2 is more difficult to contain 
than MERS-coronavirus (MERS-CoV) because of faster 
human-to-human transmission. Thus, it has spread 
globally and become a pandemic (Table 1) [1,2,6-19]. 
MERS-CoV has circulated in the Middle East since 
2012, but the ROK is the only country outside of the 
Middle East that has ever become heavily impacted by 
the virus [20]. The explosive MERS outbreak in May to 
June of 2015 revealed many issues in the nation’s public 
health crisis response [21], before its eventual contain-
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ment within about 2 months. Since then, improvements 
have been made at different levels and across the pub-
lic and private health sectors to protect society against 
threats from emerging infectious diseases (EIDs). Five 
years after the MERS outbreak, the COVID-19 pandem-
ic occurred. The country was very successful in quickly 
flattening the epidemic curve at the early phase of the 
pandemic without the draconian control measures ad-
opted in most countries [22]. The number of new dai-
ly COVID-19 cases reached its lowest level (fewer than 
10) in late April 2020. After easing restrictions such as 
strict social distancing in early May, community trans-
missions with unknown sources of infection and an in-
flow of cases from foreign countries have continuously 
occurred. Furthermore, there have been a series of out-
breaks at several mass gatherings that have spread to 
provincial cities. In this review, we review the lessons 
from the MERS-CoV outbreak that made the ROK’s re-
sponse to the COVID-19 pandemic different from that 
of other countries during early 2020. We also discuss the 
next steps the ROK can take to further improve control 
of the virus. 
Table 1. Comparison between MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2
MERS-CoV SARS-CoV-2 Reference
Host cell receptor DPP4 receptor ACE receptor [6,7,13]
Main site of reproduction Lower respiratory tract Upper respiratory tract [12,15]
Origin Unknown, bats hypothesized Bats [2]
Intermediate host reservoir Dromedary camel Possibly pangolin [2]
Main transmission route Direct/indirect contact with 
dromedary camels or infected 
persons
Droplet, direct/indirect contact, airborne, 
human-to-human
[2]
Main transmission setting Zoonotic exposure to camel, 
nosocomial outbreaks
Community; outbreaks in especially nursing 
homes, during mass gathering, religious 
group events etc.
[2]
R0 Generally under 1 Estimates range between 2.4 to up to 5.6 [8]
Transmissibility before 
symptom onset
No Yes, since 2–3 days before the symptom onset 
for symptomatic patients
[8,19]
Mean generation time 12.6–14.6 days 4.7 days (SD = 2.9) [9,11]
Main clinical 
manifestation
Fever > 38°C, cough, Shortness 
of breath, myalgia, sore throat, 
diarrhoea
Fever, cough, shortness of breath, anosmia, 
sore throat 
(a substantial proportion of infected cases 





Pneumonia, ARDS, multiorgan 
failure
Pneumonia, ARDS, coagulopathy, 
multiorgan failure
[2,14]
Main risk groups Elderly, diabetes, chronic lung, 
heart, liver and kidney disease, 
immunocompromised patients
Elderly, immunocompromised patients, 
poorly managed hypertension, diabetes and 
cardiovascular and respiratory conditions
[1,2]
Mortality Overall CFR 34.4% (probable 
overestimate due to undetected 
mild cases)
Population level IFR estimate 0.37%–0.7%
(very large variation over age groups: << 0.1% 
in under 10 year aged to up to > 20% in over 
80 years of age)
[10,16]
Confirmation test MERS-CoV RT-PCR SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR [17,18]
MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome-coronavirus; SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2; 
DPP4, dipeptidyl-peptidase-4; ACE, angiotensin-converting enzyme; SD, standard deviation; ARDS, acute respiratory distress 
syndrome; CFR, case fatality rate; IFR, infection fatality rate; RT-PCR, reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction.
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MERS OUTBREAK IN THE REPUBLIC OF  
KOREA, 2015
On 20 May 2015, a 68-year-old Korean man returning 
from travel in the Middle East was confirmed as the first 
MERS case in the ROK [23]. Since the identification of 
the causative agent in Saudi Arabia in September 2012, 
98% of MERS cases have occurred in the Middle East 
[20]. The propagation of MERS cases from the index case 
was driven mainly by transmission in one of the hos-
pitals where the index case was admitted [23]. The out-
break resulted in a total of 186 confirmed cases and 38 
deaths, with the last case confirmed on July 4, 2015, the 
46th day after the first confirmation (Fig. 1) [23]. The out-
break and response affected the entire country and had a 
detrimental impact in various areas. The socioeconomic 
impact from the outbreak was estimated to be 9 billion 
US dollars (1 US dollar equals 1,200 Korean won) [24].
The epidemiology of the MERS outbreak in the ROK 
in 2015 was characterized by predominantly nosocomi-
al transmissions and hospital clusters related to sever-
al SSEs [23,25]. The majority of confirmed cases (93%, 
173/186) were infected in healthcare-associated settings 
(12 hospitals, three clinics, and two ambulances) [25], 
which is a much higher proportion compared to Middle 
East countries, where ongoing animal-to-human trans-
mission is occurring [20]. Approximately 80% of trans-
mission events were attributed to five SSEs, which were 
characterized by more intimate contacts, unprotected 
visits in crowded emergency rooms or general wards, 
and “doctor shopping” than non-SSEs [26]. A highly 
overdispersed pattern of MERS transmission increased 
the potential for large SSEs, although the overall R0 was 
less than 1 [27,28].
Characteristics of MERS
MERS is endemic to the Arabian Peninsula, and most 
cases have occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2]. 
The natural hosts are thought to be bats, but the virus 
was transmitted to humans via dromedary camels [2]. 
Symptoms can range from none to mild or severe, and 
typically include fever, cough, diarrhea, and shortness of 
breath [2]. The disease is usually more severe in people 
with underlying health conditions [2], and its case fatali-
ty rate has been described to be as high as 35% [16].
Most MERS cases are symptomatic and the virus is 
usually transmissible only after symptom onset, aiding 
control efforts based on isolation of cases and tracing 
of exposed contacts to interrupt transmission chains 
[16]. Transmission occurs mainly by respiratory drop-
let transmission, and airborne transmission has been 
demonstrated only in healthcare settings where there 
are aerosol-generating procedures [16]. While sporadic 
cases of MERS have occurred in endemic regions (prob-
ably mostly by direct contact with camels or fresh camel 
products), larger outbreaks have been confined largely to 
healthcare settings and caused by nosocomial transmis-
sion [2]. Direct evidence for substantial and sustained 
community transmission remains elusive [2].
2015 MERS outbreak response in the ROK
The ROK was caught off guard by the first MERS cases, 
but quickly became well-organized and coordinated. Al-
though there was always a high risk for MERS-CoV giv-
en the large number of construction workers and busi-
nesspeople in the ROK who come from Middle Eastern 
countries, the MERS cases came as a complete surprise 
to health authorities. As the number of confirmed cas-
es rapidly increased, stricter outbreak investigation and 
control measures were implemented, including public 
disclosure of the affected hospitals, dispatch of a rapid 
response team, and more robust surveillance and isola-
tion/quarantine policies, between the second and third 
weeks of the outbreak [21].
The initial epidemic investigation was conducted and 
the Central Outbreak Control Headquarters was estab-
lished on the day of case confirmation [21]. The “trace, 
test, and treat” (3T) strategy was applied in collaboration 
with ministries, local governments, health experts, ep-
idemic intelligence service (EIS) officers, laboratories, 
and health facilities. Entry and exit data on international 
travelers from electronic health registries (the Drug Uti-
lization Review Registry and National Health Insurance 
Service Beneficiary Registry), Global Positioning System 
(GPS) systems, and surveillance cameras were used to 
identify potential contacts with a confirmed case. The 
integrated MERS information system was established 
within 2 weeks after the first cases were confirmed. All 
hospitalized pneumonia cases across the country on 
June 10, 2015 were screened for MERS-CoV infection 
via reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction 
(RT-PCR) to find undetected cases. A total of 16,693 con-
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tacts were quarantined in institutions or at home and 
monitored by local health authorities over the outbreak 
period (Table 2). The diagnostic capacity of the labora-
tory was quickly improved after real-time RT-PCR (rRT-
PCR) tests became available in the regional public health 
and hospital laboratories. The 24 hours MERS hotline 
(call number 109) also started to operate from May 30, 
2015. 
The MERS outbreak served as an opportunity for 
extensive health education to the general public and 
health workers. Through the repetitive communication 
of information through multiple channels, the general 
public learned about the importance of washing hands, 
wearing a face mask, maintaining respiratory etiquette, 
and practicing social distancing during the MERS-CoV 
outbreak [29-31]. Central and local governments, private 
sectors, and the mass media produced health communi-
cation materials. Health workers’ awareness of infection 
prevention and control (IPC) was improved as well [32]. 
Approximately 3,000 schools in affected areas were tem-
porarily closed, and a substantial proportion of the Kore-
an population practiced social distancing voluntarily [31].
Challenges
Confirmation of MERS-CoV infection in the index case 
was delayed by 9 days since his symptom onset. Early 
detection and response to MERS-CoV were challeng-
ing because it was initially mostly unknown to both 
physicians and the public. However, control measures 
could have been implemented to minimize contacts 
and prevent further spread. Furthermore, patients were 
not routinely asked about their travel history during 
medical consultations at hospitals or clinics. Given that 
non-isolated in-hospital days and number of contacts 
were the most important factors leading to SSEs [25,26], 
this delay may have played a crucial role in shaping the 
outbreak. 
At the beginning of the response to the outbreak of 
a novel pathogen, a broader net and more aggressive 
measures are needed to promptly limit its spread. In the 
early phase of the MERS response, a narrow case defini-
tion of a “close contact” was applied: a person who had 
physical contact with a confirmed case; or a person who 
remained within 2 m of a confirmed/suspected case for 
1 hour or more while the case was symptomatic. This 
resulted in many exposed individuals being overlooked, 
allowing them to transmit the virus beyond the radar of 
the outbreak investigation [33]. Underestimating the un-
certainties about MERS-CoV, such as the high hetero-
geneity of transmissibility, led to a loose response and a 
relatively widespread outbreak.
The ROK was insufficiently prepared to detect and re-
spond to EIDs before the MERS outbreak in 2015. There 
was a lack of functioning EID management systems. 
The responsibilities and roles of health authorities at 
the national level were fragmented and lacked clarity 
[34]. In addition, there was a lack of hierarchical commu-
nication between different levels of government, hori-
zontal cooperation, and collaboration between agencies 
[35]. No public health crisis information-sharing system 
was initially available, and well-trained human resourc-
es were insufficient. EIS officers responsible for investi-
Table 2. Comparison between MERS (2015) and COVID-19 (2020) outbreak responses in the Republic of Korea
MERS COVID-19
First case confirmed 20 May 2015 20 January 2020
Escalation of crisis alert level Blue→Yellow (20 May 2015) Blue→Yellow (20 January 2020)
Yellow→Orange (27 January 2020)
Orange→Red (23 February 2020)
First confirmation test available at the subnational level 30 May 2015 24 January 2020
No of laboratories capable of confirmation testing 
 (as of February 2020)
63 118
No of rRT-PCR test conducted 44,768 (by 31 December 2015) 1,094,704 (by 13 June 2020)
Cumulative number of people quarantined 16,693 324,160 (by 10 June 2020)
MERS, Middle East respiratory syndrome; COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019; rRT-PCR, real-time reverse transcription 
polymerase chain reaction.
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gating the outbreak were over-stretched, as were public 
health staff charged with contact tracing. There were 
not enough hospitals with airborne infection isolation 
rooms (AIIRs) to provide care for all MERS patients. 
Laboratory diagnostic capacity, which is key to the early 
detection and control of an EID outbreak, was also con-
strained [21]. 
Nosocomial transmission accounted for most MERS 
cases in the ROK in 2015. The country had hospital-use 
behaviors predisposing the intra- and inter-hospital 
spread of emerging pathogens. Doctor shopping, facili-
tated by existing healthcare systems permitting patients 
to choose among healthcare practitioners, was identified 
as one of the risk factors for SSEs [26,36], and enabled 
a single index case to lead to three generations of sec-
ondary infections [37]. The movement of cases between 
hospitals created a chain of transmission that was dif-
ficult for health officials to trace. In addition, families, 
caregivers, and visitors to hospitals made up 38% (71/186) 
of the total number of cases in the outbreak. Those who 
spent time with patients in overcrowded healthcare fa-
cilities contributed to the spread of infections [36]. 
Despite the government’s efforts, the MERS risk com-
munication strategy failed to sufficiently build public 
trust in the national control measures against MERS 
[38-41]. Information-sharing with the general public was 
not sufficiently timely or transparent, and unfounded 
rumors spread through social media and messaging 
applications [42]. Misperceptions about disease severity 
and incidence drove public anxiety and panic. The in-
terests of the government, hospitals, and general public 
differed sharply with respect to whether the list of af-
fected hospitals should be disclosed [21]. Inefficient in-
ter-agency communication and inconsistent messaging 
also added to the general confusion. 
 
HOW THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA PREPARED 
FOR NEW EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
BETWEEN 2015 AND 2020
The ROK learned the hard way from the MERS out-
break. During and after the outbreak, the country de-
veloped a national containment infrastructure against 
EIDs. The master plans for reform of the national in-
fectious disease prevention and management system 
were announced by the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(MOHW) in September 2015, and its implementation 
was closely tracked [43]. The pillars of the plan included 
early detection of EIDs, increased surge capacity to han-
dle outbreaks, reform of national infectious disease con-
trol systems, and improvement of hospital IPC systems. 
The Korean government implemented active mon-
itoring of communicable diseases outbreak situations 
outside of the country implementing entry screening at 
airports and seaports, and immediate isolation of sus-
pected cases at a quarantine station in the port of entry 
[43]. The Emergency Operation Center (EOC) in the Ko-
rea Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (KCDC) 
was established in January 2016 and has run 24/7 since 
then. The legislation was amended for a rapid response 
team to be organized and deployed in case of an inci-
dent, and EIS officers are to lead the management of 
the situation [43]. To enhance the epidemic investiga-
tion workforce, the number of central EIS officers was 
increased from 34 in 2015 to 77 in 2020, and local gov-
ernments were encouraged to recruit 2 local EIS officers 
per province [43].
Laboratory capacity was enhanced to accommodate 
large-scale diagnostic testing in emergency situations. 
The Korean government has invested in diagnostics 
research and development, and many private molecu-
lar diagnostic companies have also responded. In 2017, 
the Centre for Laboratory Control of Infectious Diseases 
in KCDC and the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety ad-
opted the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) system, 
which facilitates the rapid approval of diagnostic test 
kits in response to an EID outbreak [44]. The Center also 
established a quality assessment program for molecular 
diagnostics for EIDs in collaboration with the Korean 
Society for Laboratory Medicine [45].
The KCDC director position was elevated to a 
Vice-Minister level, and the coordination between cen-
tral and local governments was improved. The number 
of regional centers for disease control increased from 
one in 2015 to five in 2016. The number of staff for infec-
tious disease response at the subnational level increased 
by more than 360 [46]. Standard operating procedures 
for crisis management were renewed in June 2016 [46].
During the MERS outbreak in 2015, hospitals learned 
that insufficient IPC could significantly impact hospi-
tal management and finance. They gained institutional 
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knowledge about how to set up MERS-CoV screening 
stations [47], the importance of proper training for put-
ting on and taking off personal protective equipment, 
the need for an increasing number of AIIRs, improved 
room layouts to separate infectious disease patients 
from non-infectious disease patients, and well-trained 
healthcare personnel to care for patients with EIDs [48]. 
Some hospital IPC activities became eligible for financial 
support from National Health Insurance in July 2016. 
The Korean Society of Infectious Diseases published the 
Guidelines on MERS Prevention and Control for Health Fa-
cilities in December 2015 [49]. Hospitals were encouraged 
to limit the number of caregivers and visitors by keep-
ing a logbook or issuing visitor passes. Systems were put 
in place to encourage hospitals to improve their visitor 
policies, and those that followed best practices were pro-
vided with a certificate [43]. 
Practices in IPC at emergency departments were im-
proved. More AIIRs and general rooms were created 
at Emergency Medical Centers [43]. Legislation was in-
troduced in December 2015 requiring Regional Emer-
gency Medical Centers to be equipped with AIIRs [43]. 
In addition, in 2016, financial support was provided 
for the establishment and maintenance of AIIRs. The 
out-of-pocket payment for mild or non-urgent diseas-
es at emergency departments was increased in 2016 to 
discourage unnecessary visits and reduce crowding. 
Hospitals were also encouraged to redesign emergency 
removes to create separate spaces and enable physical 
distancing between patients. 
The 2015 MERS outbreak provided a foundation for 
amendments to the Infectious Disease Prevention and 
Control Act that enabled the MOHW and KCDC to col-
lect, and share extensive personal data during serious 
infectious disease outbreaks [50,51]. In the early stage of 
the outbreak, detailed movements of individuals were 
withheld for fear of reidentification and lost business. 
Later (June 2015), high demand from the public and 
health professionals justified increased information 
sharing to alert individuals who may have come into 
contact with an infected person or contaminated envi-
ronment [21,33,50].
A joint external evaluation in 2017 concluded that the 
overall International Health Regulation (2005) core ca-
pacities of the ROK were fulfilled, with the majority of 
indicators in 19 technical areas reflecting a sustainable 
capacity (60.4%) or demonstrated capacity (31.3%) [52]. It 
also noted that the country’s impressive preparedness 
was derived from its recent experience with the MERS 
outbreak in 2015, and that continued multisectoral ef-
fort and stable investment would enable the country to 
sustain such a high level of capacity. 
The country had an opportunity to test and further re-
fine its preparedness soon after the first MERS outbreak. 
On September 9, 2018, the first MERS-CoV case after the 
2015 outbreak was detected in the ROK [46]. The patient, 
who arrived from the Middle East, visited a hospital on 
the day he arrived at the airport. The case was immedi-
ately confirmed as MERS-CoV infection at the hospital. 
The government immediately convened a press confer-
ence and coordinated a nationwide response. The rapid 
response team identified 21 close contacts and 487 ca-
sual contacts, all of whom were quarantined and moni-
tored. There were no secondary transmissions reported. 
COVID-19 EPIDEMIC IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
KOREA, EARLY 2020
After China, the ROK was one of the first countries to 
experience a massive surge in COVID-19 cases in the 
early 2020. The first confirmed COVID-19 case in the 
country was reported on January 20, 2020; as of June 
12, 2020, 12,003 cases and 277 deaths had been reported, 
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Figure 1. Daily confirmed Middle East respiratory syndrome 
(MERS, 2015) and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19, 2020) 
cases in the Republic Korea, rolling 7-day average. The last 
MERS case in 2015 was confirmed on 4 July 2015, the 46th 
day after the first confirmed case.
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909 on 28 February 2020 (Fig. 1) [53]. A cluster of cases re-
lated to a large religious sect congregation in late Febru-
ary to early March dominated the outbreak, accounting 
for nearly half of the total number of cases in the ROK 
(43%). As most cases related to the cluster were young, 
more than one-third of the total confirmed cases in the 
entire country (38%) were in their 20s or 30s. As of June 
12, 2020, the overall case-fatality rate was 2.3%, ranging 
from 0 among people under 30 years old to 26% among 
those aged 80 years or older. Nosocomial transmissions, 
as well as various community clusters, such as house-
holds, nursing homes, call centers, fitness dance classes, 
churches, and clubs, have been reported [54-56].
Characteristics of COVID-19
As SARS-CoV-2 is a novel virus, rigorous research is 
ongoing globally and its knowledge is evolving quickly. 
We have briefly summarized current knowledge about 
SARS-CoV-2, as of June 2020. SARS-CoV-2, the causative 
agent for COVID-19 [57], enters its host cell by binding 
to angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) receptors, 
which are prevalent on the mucosal surface (Table 1) [58]. 
SARS-CoV-2 is a member of a large group of related vi-
ruses with zoonotic potential (as recognized by World 
Health Organization [WHO]) carried by bats, which 
serve as the natural reservoir [59]. The virus is thought 
to have transmitted to humans through an intermediate 
host (hypothesized to be pangolins) in a seafood market 
in Wuhan, China, near the end of 2019. However, this 
hypothesis has not been verified at present, and other 
possibilities for the cross-species transmission event 
have been proposed [60].
SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted between individuals 
through respiratory droplets and direct contact routes, 
or by indirect contact with freshly contaminated sur-
faces [61-63]. Under certain conditions where there is 
efficient production of respiratory aerosols, the mode 
of transmission may resemble airborne transmission 
[64]. SARS-CoV-2 replicates primarily in the upper re-
spiratory tract, but can in some cases cause pneumonia 
and acute respiratory distress syndrome [12,15]. The vi-
rus deserves to be named the “stealth virus,” as it has a 
relatively long incubation period of around 5 days (2 to 
14) [65], which allows it to move silently through popu-
lations before being detected [8,66]. In addition, the vi-
rus is relatively easily transmitted, probably in both the 
presymptomatic and early symptomatic stages of infec-
tion. It can spread quite rapidly in a population if not 
recognized quickly [19]. Mass gatherings with high pop-
ulation density and frequent use of elevated voices, par-
ticularly in indoor settings with poor ventilation, consti-
tute particularly favorable conditions for outbreaks (e.g., 
large sports gatherings, religious masses, and concerts) 
[3]. It is not fully understood whether SSEs are caused by 
circumstances that are favorable for transmission or by 
high virus excretion by specific individuals [3].
The majority of those infected suffer a relatively mild 
or even asymptomatic infection [67]. However, as is the 
case with many viral respiratory infections, the risk for 
severe outcomes, including death, increases markedly 
with age [10]. Male sex, some conditions of the respi-
ratory tract, and immune deficiency are risk factors for 
severe or fatal outcomes [10]. Estimates of mortality rates 
are not yet available, but initial estimates are much low-
er than those described for MERS-CoV, ranging from 
close to zero in healthy people under 40 years of age to 
10s of percentage points in people over 70 years of age 
with underlying conditions [10].
SARS-CoV-2 is spreading rapidly globally. As of June 
13, 2020, 7.7 million cases and nearly half a million 
deaths had been reported from 216 countries/areas/ter-
ritories since December 31, 2019, when the outbreak was 
first reported to the WHO [68]. Effective pharmaceutical 
interventions, such as vaccines and therapeutics, are not 
yet available as of June 2020. However, traditional pub-
lic health containment methods (e.g., early recognition 
of an outbreak, access to specific test methods such as 
nucleic acid-based amplification, isolation of cases, and 
quarantine of exposed contacts) are effective for flatten-
ing the epidemic curve [69]. Personal risks can be sub-
stantially reduced by carefully maintaining physical dis-
tance and rigorous hand hygiene measures [69].
COVID-19 epidemic response in the Republic of 
Korea
While some countries imposed draconian measures to 
interrupt the transmission of the virus, including le-
gally restricting the mobility of individuals, the ROK 
prioritized increasing laboratory test capacity to imple-
ment the 3T strategy, which was developed and refined 
during the previous MERS-CoV outbreaks (Table 2) [70]. 
KCDC began developing COVID-19 testing on January 
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13, 2020, when there was only one case reported outside 
of mainland China. Laboratory testing for COVID-19 
first became available at KCDC on January 24, 2020, fol-
lowed by 17 regional laboratories (Provincial Institutes 
for Public Health and Environment) [54]. A SARS-CoV-2 
rRT-PCR test, for which results are available in 6 hours, 
became available at all 18 regional laboratories on Janu-
ary 31, 2020 [71] and at private laboratories from Febru-
ary 7, 2020 [54]. By April 2020, five companies’ diagnos-
tic reagents had been granted an EUA, and the number 
of private laboratories and tertiary hospitals capable of 
COVID-19 testing had increased to 118 [70]. As of June 
12, 2020, the ROK has tested about 1.1 million samples in 
total, with a maximum daily testing capacity of 60,000. 
By June 13, 2020, public and private health systems had 
joined forces to provide laboratory confirmation at 573 
testing sites across the country, which has been facili-
tated by innovative approaches such as drive-through or 
walk-through testing to meet the massive test demand 
and ensure the safety of healthcare workers [72,73].
Extensive contact tracing and isolation using infor-
mation technology (IT) has allowed the government to 
efficiently break the chains of community transmission. 
For example, more than 10,000 potential contacts of a 
single confirmed case who attended a religious sect ser-
vice were traced and tested regardless of their symptoms. 
Supported by legislation introduced after the MERS 
outbreak in 2015, IT enabled efficient tracing. Data from 
mobile phones, surveillance cameras, and credit trans-
actions have been utilized to identify and quarantine 
those in contact with the confirmed cases and to quickly 
isolate those who tested positive [74]. The locations and 
routes of confirmed cases have been promptly publi-
cized on websites or mobile applications to encourage 
people to get tested and quarantine themselves if they 
were in close proximity with any confirmed cases. The 
IT-supported local authorities monitor symptoms and 
compliance of contacts and people arriving from other 
countries under 14-day self- or facility-quarantine. As 
of April 27, 2020, people who violate the self-quaran-
tine regulation are subject to wear a quarantine tracker 
wristband or be placed in a quarantine facility at their 
own cost. 
Lives were saved by reserving beds for more severe 
COVID-19 patients and putting milder cases in dorms. 
Moderate to severe cases were isolated and treated in 
AIIRs at government-designated hospitals. Subclinical 
or mild cases were admitted to community treatment 
centers (CTCs), which were isolation facilities trans-
formed from dorms, to be monitored and isolated from 
others [70]. Confirmed COVID-19 cases were treated 
free-of-charge regardless of nationality. Although the 
majority of patients were young, the steep increase in 
cases from the outbreak related to the religious sect con-
gregation strained the healthcare system, particularly 
in the region where the incident took place. About 20 
CTCs were established as of May 2020, and nearly 400 
COVID-19-free hospitals have been designated across 
the country for undisrupted, safe non-COVID-19 clin-
ical practices. In addition, hospitals have been repur-
posed to increase their capacity to care for COVID-19 
patients [75]. 
Non-pharmaceutical interventions were implement-
ed rigorously in the ROK with the voluntary participa-
tion of its citizens. A social distancing campaign start-
ed on February 29, 2020; an enhanced phase was put in 
place on March 22, and restrictions were eased on May 
6. The campaign recommended avoiding mass gather-
ings, postponing the school term from early March to 
May, and encouraging working from home. A survey 
conducted in April 2020 indicated that compliance to 
social distancing practices was as high as 83.4% to 92.3% 
[31]. Self-hygiene-promotion campaigns were led by 
both public and private sectors on a large scale. Mul-
tiple information channels, including TV and radio 
spots, posters, and social media, emphasized frequent 
handwashing, respiratory etiquette, and wearing a mask, 
which were adopted by three-quarters of the general 
population [31].
Based on lessons learned from the MERS outbreak 
in 2015, hospitals proactively enhanced IPC to prevent 
nosocomial transmission. They quickly established 
COVID-19 screening stations to prevent non-COVID-19 
patients and healthcare workers from being exposed 
to COVID-19 cases, thereby maintaining routine clini-
cal services. In addition, they implemented strong IPC 
measures as well as body temperature screening and 
mandatory mask-wearing. The national guidelines on 
COVID-19 for hospitals were published on March 10, 
2020 [76]. For long-term care facilities (LTCFs), where 
the most vulnerable populations reside, a designated 
manager in each facility was responsible for monitor-
279www.kjim.orghttps://doi.org/10.3904/kjim.2020.371
Yang TU, et al. COVID-19 epidemic in Republic of Korea
ing the response to COVID-19 and communicating with 
local health authorities. Orientations on IPC were pro-
vided to some LTCF staff, and people admitted to LTCF 
have been screened for COVID-19 prior to admission 
since May 16, 2020.
The ROK has thus far allowed its borders to remain 
open. Rather than shutting down borders, the country 
enhanced screening at all airports and seaports by re-
quiring all people arriving from other countries to fill 
out questionnaires, monitoring body temperatures, and 
implementing on-site testing. The Korean government 
imposed special entry procedures that were expanded 
from visitors from China (February 4, 2020) to visitors 
from all countries (March 19, 2020). All internation-
al travelers must install a mobile application to report 
COVID-19-like symptoms daily, as well as their location 
to the local health authorities, during a mandatory 14-
day quarantine.
PREPARATION FOR SUBSEQUENT WAVES 
SARS-CoV-2 seems unlikely to follow the course of 
SARS-CoV, which suddenly disappeared after strong 
public health countermeasures were implemented 
across different parts of the world [77]. Instead, it is likely 
to continue circulating for an extended period of time, 
causing periodic resurgences depending on factors such 
as countermeasures, human behavior, and environmen-
tal variables [78]. The virus may even persist for some 
time after a safe and effective vaccine becomes available. 
In the entire history of mankind, only once has an in-
fectious disease been eliminated by a vaccine. Howev-
er, in the meantime SARS-CoV-2 may be controlled by 
self-hygiene, social distancing, and therapeutics. 
SARS-CoV-2 was an “unknown unknown”: most 
governments have struggled to control it in the initial 
phase. However, the role of government is critical in 
preparing for subsequent waves of the COVID-19 pan-
demic. Both central and local governments should de-
velop contingency plans for worst-case scenarios. The 
pandemic may worsen later in 2020, as COVID-19 and 
influenza circulate simultaneously [79]. Government 
agencies should develop strategies to progressively in-
crease healthcare surge capacity to meet peak demand, 
so-called “raising the bar,” including measures to pro-
tect healthcare workers. 
Until either vaccine administration or natural infec-
tion result in sufficient population immunity, infec-
tious disease control measures should be modified and 
implemented on a country-specific basis, leveraging the 
most recent knowledge about the virus to reduce its in-
cidence. These measures include surveillance, quaran-
tine, laboratory testing, case management and isolation, 
contact tracing, and physical distancing. At the same 
time, to alleviate response fatigue in the population due 
to the prolonged emergency situation, the government 
should carefully select the most appropriate and flexible 
COVID-19 response activities. 
The ROK attracted global attention for its early surge 
in COVID-19 cases in early 2020, and later for its ag-
gressive interventions (the Korean 3T strategy), which 
other countries were skeptical about for their perceived 
non-sustainability and breach of human rights. Rigor-
ous testing, the first element of the strategy, is based on 
the maintenance of a large number of testing facilities 
and high testing capacity. The financial sustainability 
of the strategy and its cost-benefit ratio require further 
review. Extensive IT-supported epidemic investigation 
and tracing, followed by strict restriction of mobility 
for every case and contact, are considered additional 
elements of the 3T strategy to interrupt transmission. 
However, human rights controversies have been raised, 
particularly by Western countries, because such inves-
tigation requires the collection of extensive personal 
medical and nonmedical data [51], and GPS and quaran-
tine tracker wristbands are used to limit the movement 
of contacts. Broader stakeholder discussions are needed 
to reach an agreement on the balance between the effec-
tiveness of the interventions and the protection of hu-
man privacy rights. Finally, although CTCs have helped 
reduce the burden of COVID-19, the facility isolation/
treatment policy has put a heavy workload on healthcare 
workers. Because SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted relative-
ly silently and rapidly, and a substantial proportion of 
COVID-19 cases among vulnerable people can become 
critical, healthcare systems may be quickly overbur-
dened in the absence of appropriate control measures. 
Therefore, urgent actions are needed to improve IPC 
practices in nursing homes and LTCFs [80], repurpose 
and reshape hospitals [75], increase critical care capaci-
ty, and stockpile enough personal protective equipment 
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for healthcare workers. Strategies to prevent burnout 
among healthcare workers should be established be-
fore subsequent waves to support the healthcare system 
while implementing the 3T strategy. 
As the COVID-19 pandemic evolves, false or mislead-
ing information has created unnecessary panic in the 
population. Some serious incidents related to this "in-
fodemic" have been reported in the ROK. For example, a 
religious group leader unknowingly inoculated his con-
gregation with SARS-CoV-2 by serially spraying saltwa-
ter contaminated with the virus into their mouths [81]. 
Another example is methanol intoxication after using 
methanol spray for disinfection in an enclosed room. 
Most scientists are inexperienced in communicating 
with the public rather than other scientists. To counter-
act the infodemic, scientists and experts should be pro-
active in delivering science-based facts and correcting 
false or misleading information.
FIVE-YEAR VIEW 
Although public health preparedness and health sys-
tem resilience have improved throughout the responses 
to EIDs in the ROK, further efforts are needed to bet-
ter prepare for preventing and managing EIDs. To the 
greatest extent possible, these efforts need to be based 
on science. Innovation and global solidarity may help 
with this. One good example is an ongoing project 
funded by the Gates Foundation utilizing artificial in-
telligence-based information and communication tech-
nology to enhance surveillance and outbreak forecasting 
[82]. Successful innovations and local experience must 
be quickly and widely shared at the global level to help 
overcome common challenges. 
Prompt development of diagnostic tests, as well as ef-
fective and safe therapeutics and vaccines, is a critical 
factor for controlling EIDs. Drug repurposing, new drug 
screening, the use of convalescent plasma, and mono-
clonal antibody development have been proposed for 
use as prophylactics or treatments for critical patients 
[83]. Effective therapeutics may be more easily identified 
through drug repurposing, which would not require 
new safety reviews, and therapeutics for very ill require 
less rigorous safety reviews than vaccines given to large, 
healthy populations. However, investing in vaccine de-
velopment remains necessary, because a vaccine is need-
ed to achieve population immunity while avoiding the 
negative impact of high infection rates [84]. Rapid, mass 
production of COVID-19 vaccines, distribution of the 
vaccines to vulnerable or marginalized populations in 
middle- and low-income countries, low vaccine immu-
nogenicity among older adults, and vaccine safety issues 
will remain challenges even after vaccines are autho-
rized for use [85].
Rigorous research should be conducted to determine 
the optimal combination of countermeasures for each 
country, taking into account sustainability and direct 
health costs as well as social burden. For example, the 
health and social benefits of maintaining in-school 
education should be carefully balanced against the in-
creased risk for SARS-CoV-2 infections. School closures 
do not only interrupt learning, but may also aggravate 
inequity and malnutrition for socially disadvantaged 
children and increase dropout rates, which in turn 
have long-term economic and social consequences [86]. 
School closures may create additional child-care obli-
gations [87], and there is not yet robust epidemiological 
evidence that children are significant drivers of commu-
nity transmission [88].
The ROK can figuratively be said to have been “vacci-
nated” against EIDs by the major MERS-CoV outbreak 
in 2015, which enabled the country to swiftly scale up 
its EID response systems. Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Taiwan, the countries hit hardest by SARS in 2003, re-
sponded well to the COVID-19 pandemic during the 
early phase. They strengthened their EID outbreak re-
sponse capacity based on lessons learned from past fail-
ures, and thereby responded aggressively and promptly 
to COVID-19 from the beginning. They learned how an 
unknown infectious disease can disrupt the integrity of 
society with massive health and economic consequenc-
es, and that over-reaction is better than under-reaction.
EIDs will continue to emerge, sometimes with cata-
strophic economic consequences. Deforestation has re-
sulted in human exposure to various pathogens silently 
residing in wildlife. Viruses can evolve to infect novel 
hosts, thus increasing their chances of reproducing. 
Certain high-risk human activities, such as maintaining 
live animal markets, increase the likelihood of exposure 
to animal viruses with zoonotic potential, and globaliza-
tion and massive international traffic have caused more 
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rapid global EID transmission. The ROK, a major hub 
for international travel and trade, must be comprehen-
sively prepared for future EIDs. 
CONCLUSIONS
The 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak in the ROK served as a 
stress test to expose weaknesses in healthcare systems 
and infectious disease control and management systems. 
Significant progress in response to that outbreak en-
abled a rapid and aggressive response to the COVID-19 
pandemic in early 2020 in the country. The massive epi-
demic curve has been successfully flattened through the 
cooperation of the population, the medical community, 
and the government. In general, the public has adhered 
well to social distancing, wearing masks, and hand-
washing. Hospitals responded proactively against the 
epidemic by enhancing IPC and healthworkers worked 
hard to diagnose and treat COVID-19 patients. The 
KCDC has coordinated actions from central and local 
governments to implement the 3T strategy while mo-
bilizing IT, a major legacy of the 2015 MERS outbreak. 
However, there is currently a window of opportunity to 
further increase the surveillance system’s vigilance and 
strengthen healthcare capacities, particularly in critical 
care. In the middle of 2020, before a potential second 
wave, we must rapidly develop functional and compre-
hensive national preparedness and response plans, in 
parallel with accelerating the development of vaccines 
and therapeutics.
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